first, which then join together at angles of 60 degrees, while others attach themselves at every point in exactly the same way, until everything has turned to ice, so that during this time the water between the rackets of ice does not gradually become more viscous, but remains as completely fluid as it would be if it were at a much higher temperature, and yet is fully as cold as the ice and the matter that separates itself, which suddenly escapes at the moment of solidification, is a considerable quantum of caloric, the departure of which, because it was required only for maintaining a fluid state, leaves what is now all ice not the least bit colder than was the water that shortly before was still fluid.[8]

Many salts as well as stones that have a crystalline figure are generated in the same way from some sort of earth which is, by means of who knows what sort of mediation, dissolved in water. The drusy[9] 5: 349
configurations of many minerals,[a] such as cubic galenite,[10] pyrargyrite,[11] and so on, are in all likelihood formed in the same way, in water, by means of the precipitation of their parts, when by some cause they are forced to leave this vehicle and to combine with one another into determinate external shapes.

But even internally all materials that were fluid only because of heat and which through cooling have become solid reveal, when broken, a determinate texture, and thus make it possible to judge that if their own weight or contact with air had not prevented it, they would also have displayed their specifically proper shape externally: this sort of thing has been observed in some metals which had hardened externally after melting but were still fluid on the inside, by drawing off the inner, still fluid part and then precipitating calmly the rest which was left behind. Many of these mineral crystallizations, such as spar-druses, hematite or aragonite,[12] often have shapes of extreme beauty, which art could hardly think up; and the halo of the cave on Antiparos is merely the product of water dripping through a bed of gypsum.

The fluid is, to all appearances, older than the solid, and both the plants as well as animal bodies are formed from fluid nutritive matter that has formed itself in a state of rest: in the latter case, to be sure, first and foremost in accordance with a certain original predisposition directed at ends (which, as will be shown in the second part, must be judged of[b] not aesthetically but teleologically, in accordance with the principle of realism);[13] but perhaps also as precipitating and forming itself freely, in accordance with the universal laws of the affinity of materials. Now just as the watery fluids dissolved in an atmosphere, which is a mixture of different types of air, when the former are separated from the latter because of the departure of heat, generate

[a] Reading *Mineralien* as in the first edition rather than *Minern* as in the second.
[b] *beurtheilt*

snowflakes[a] which, depending on the difference of the particular mixture of air, often have a very artistic-appearing and extremely beautiful figure, so it may well be thought, without detracting anything from the teleological principle for judging of[b] organization, that as far as the beauty of flowers, of birdfeathers, and seashells is concerned, in terms of both their shape and their color, these can be ascribed to nature and its faculty for forming itself aesthetically and purposively in its freedom, without special ends aimed at that, in accordance with chemical
5: 350 laws, by the deposit of the matter requisite for the organization.

However, what downright proves the principle of the **ideality** of the purposiveness in the beautiful in nature as that which is always our basis in the aesthetic judgment itself, and which does not allow us to use any realism of an end in it as an explanatory ground for our power of representation, is that in the judging[c] of beauty in general we seek the standard for it in ourselves *a priori*, and the power of aesthetic judgment, with regard to the judgment whether or not something is beautiful, is itself legislative, which could not be the case on the assumption of the realism of the purposiveness of nature; because then we would have to learn from nature what we have to find beautiful, and the judgment of taste would be subject to empirical principles. For in such judging[d] what is at issue is not what nature is or even what it is for us as a purpose, but how we take it in. It would always be an objective purposiveness of nature if it had created its forms for our satisfaction, and not a subjective purposiveness, which rests on the play of the imagination in its freedom, where it is a favor with which we take nature in and not a favor that it shows to us.[e] That nature has the property of containing an occasion for us to perceive the inner purposiveness in the relationship of our mental powers in the judging of[f] certain of its products, and indeed as something that has to be explained as necessarily and universally valid on the basis of a supersensible ground, cannot be an end of nature, or rather be judged[g] by us as such a thing: because otherwise the judgment that would thereby be determined would be grounded in heteronomy and would not, as befits a judgment of taste, be free and grounded in autonomy.

In beautiful art the principle of the idealism of purposiveness can be recognized even more distinctly. For that here it is aesthetic realism by

[a] *Schneefiguren*
[b] *Beurtheilung*
[c] *Beurtheilung*
[d] *Beurtheilung*
[e] *nicht Gunst, die sie uns erzeigt*; in the first edition, *nicht eine solche die sie uns erzeugt* (not one that nature generates for us).
[f] *Beurtheilung*
[g] *beurtheilt*